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CORNELL CORNER 
BEYOND BABY-SPLITTING:  
ARBITRATOR DECISION-MAKING PATTERNS 
IN EMPLOYMENT CASES 
Alexander Colvin and Kelly Pike* 
 
Introduction 
That arbitrators tend to “split the baby” by issuing compromise 
awards is amongst the hoariest of clichés in the dispute resolution 
field. While the idea of arbitrators as baby-splitters has been challenged 
by commentators and lacks support in empirical evidence,1 the idea is 
surprisingly persistent.2 More importantly, it may be continuing to 
influence the decisions of actors whether or not to use arbitration to 
resolve disputes. A 1997 survey conducted by David Lipsky, Ronald 
Seeber, and Richard Fincher found that 49.7% of general counsels of 
Fortune 1000 corporations reported that concerns about compromise 
decisions was one of their reasons for not using arbitration.3 
                                                          
* Alexander Colvin is Professor of Labor Relations and Conflict Resolution at the ILR 
School at Cornell University.  His research and teaching focuses on employment dispute 
resolution, with a particular emphasis on procedures in nonunion workplaces and the 
impact of the legal environment on organizations. Kelly Pike recently obtained her PhD 
from the ILR School at Cornell University and is doing postdoctoral research in Toronto. 
Her research focus is on labour standards, employment relations, and dispute resolution 
in the global apparel industry, with a particular interest in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
The authors thank the American Arbitration Association (AAA) for its generous 
assistance in providing access to the arbitration case files analyzed in this study. In 
particular, the staff of the AAA’s Boston office was unfailingly supportive and helpful to 
the researchers during the time-consuming process of reviewing the case files. Earlier 
versions of this work were presented at the annual meeting of the National Academy of 
Arbitrators and benefited from the generous feedback of participants in that conference. 
All conclusions, errors, and omissions are the responsibility of the authors. 
1 Christopher R. Drahozal, Busting Arbitration Myths, 56 KAN. L. REV. 663–76 (2008); 
Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”: 
Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573 
(2001).  
2 Kenneth I. Juster, The Santa Elena Case: Two Steps Forward, Three Steps Back, 10 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 371–81 (1999). 
3 David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. Seeber, and Richard D. Fincher. Emerging Systems for 
Managing Workplace Conflict. Jossey-Bass: San Francisco, CA (2003) at p. 111. 
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Where does the idea of arbitrators as baby-splitters come from? 
One domain that may appear to give credence to this idea is the 
process of interest arbitration. In interest arbitration, the arbitrator is 
deciding on a contract that is likely to be somewhere between the 
final offers of each of the parties. This does not mean, however, that 
the arbitrator is simply “splitting the baby” by picking a point half 
way between the two parties positions. Rather, if we assume 
reasonably experienced and rational negotiators, the parties in 
bargaining will be moving towards final negotiating positions that are 
each close to what the most likely compromise outcome will be. In 
interest arbitration, it is the negotiating behavior of the parties, not the 
decision-making of the arbitrator, which drives the compromise 
outcomes.  
What about in rights arbitration? Here we no longer have the same 
process of bargaining leading up to the final offers of the parties as in 
interest arbitration, but rather a process in which the arbitrator is 
adjudicating the rights of the parties under a contract or statute. The 
rational for expecting baby-splitting here is the fear that arbitrators 
will want to satisfy both of the parties in order to receive selection as 
the arbitrator for future cases. This baby-splitting could occur by 
issuing a compromise decision in an individual case or a balancing of 
the win rates between the parties over multiple cases. It is important 
to recognize, however, that these arguments for baby-splitting 
behavior rest on a series of assumptions. One is that the parties in 
selecting an arbitrator are looking for someone who will favor their 
own side rather than looking for an arbitrator who will provide a fair 
decision. Another assumption is that the arbitrator will be equally 
concerned about satisfying each of the two parties and so will want to 
split the baby between them. A related assumption is that the 
arbitrator will be concerned about satisfying these two parties to the 
case rather than primarily being guided by professional norms and 
ethics or the interests of maintaining a more general reputation in the 
industry for integrity and fairness in decision-making. If these 
assumptions are not in fact correct, then it undermines the rationales 
for expecting baby-splitting behavior by arbitrators. 
We examine empirically the question of whether arbitrators 
actually engage in baby-splitting or instead exhibit different pattern in 
their decision-making by analyzing claims and outcomes in a sample 
of employment arbitration cases administered by the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA).       
  CORNELL CORNER 59 
 
Arbitral Decision-Making Patterns 
We begin by considering what patterns we might expect to see in 
decisions if arbitrators were engaged in baby-splitting and then 
alternatively what other decision-making patterns may be evident in 
arbitration outcomes.  
A tendency to engage in the splitting-the-baby approach to arbitral 
decision-making could manifest itself in two respects.4 One is to 
balance, over time, who wins each case, so that each side (e.g., 
employers and employees in employment arbitration) will win 
roughly half of the total number of cases. Here the argument is that 
since arbitrators depend on selection by both parties for future 
business, arbitrators will consider the proportion of decisions that 
favor each party. That is not to say that the arbitrator will make 
rulings that clearly depart from the merits of the dispute in question; 
however, this argument suggests that in marginal cases the arbitrator 
may tend to balance out who is favored in decisions over a period of 
time. A second manifestation of splitting the baby in decision-making 
could occur in situations where some amount of damages is awarded. 
A tendency to favor compromise decisions could be seen here in the 
awarding of some, but not all, of the damages claimed.5 Such 
compromise awards may be justified by the facts of the case, but the 
criticism is that arbitrators too often make compromise awards in an 
attempt to keep both parties reasonably satisfied.  
On the other hand, if arbitrators are not engaging in baby-splitting, 
what alternative patterns in outcomes might we expect to see? An 
alternative starting point is to recognize that in rights arbitration, and 
particularly in employment arbitration, the arbitrator is acting as a 
type of private judge and so we might expect to see patterns of 
decision-making more similar to those of the courts. For example in 
adjudication in the courts, there is a clear division in the decision-
making process between determination of liability and subsequently 
determination of remedies. So in employment litigation, we would see 
an outcome pattern where a common result is a denial of employer 
liability and therefore no award of any damages, producing a 
distribution with a clustering of zero dollar outcomes. In contrast, an 
alternative tendency sometimes claimed for arbitrators is that they will 
                                                          
4 For a good review and critique of the premises of the splitting-the-baby criticisms of 
arbitration, see Drahozal, Busting Arbitration Myths. 
5 Id.; Keer & Naimark. Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”: Empirical Evidence from 
International Business Arbitrations. 
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be more likely to award some small amount of damages even when 
liability might not be supported under the relevant legal standard. 
Litigation in the courts is designed to be an all-or-nothing decision-
making process on the issue of liability. For example, absent proof of 
discrimination, a court should deny any liability to an employee on a 
claim of employment discrimination, regardless of how the judge or 
jury may feel about the fairness of the employer’s conduct. Arbitrators 
are not bound by the same rules of evidence as courts and may not be 
as narrowly constrained in the factors they consider in their decision-
making. To the degree that fairness norms are incorporated into arbitral 
decision-making in addition to strict legal standards, employment 
arbitrators may tend to award at least some damages to an employee 
claimant in cases where there has been unfairness in the employer’s 
action, even if it does not rise to the level of a statutory or contractual 
violation. If there is a tendency of employment arbitrators to award 
employee complaints some degree of recovery based on fairness 
norms, then this would make arbitration a more attractive process for 
employees and their representatives. Conversely, if there is a fear that 
arbitrators incorporate fairness norms into their decision-making and 
award claimants at least some amount even in the absence of liability, 
then this may lead some employers to disfavor arbitration.6 If this 
tendency is present, then empirically this would be observable in 
relatively fewer observations of zero damages being awarded. 
We need to also consider whether there is likely to be a difference 
in how arbitrators respond to particular kinds of claims as compared 
to litigation decision-makers. A common complaint against litigation, 
particularly cited by businesses in justifying adoption of arbitration, is 
that juries are unpredictable, more sympathetic to consumers and 
employees than to businesses, and subject to emotional appeals that 
lead to extremely large damage awards not justified by the facts of the 
case.7 By contrast, arbitrators are professional neutrals who are less 
likely to be swayed by rhetoric or emotional appeals. Instead, as 
experts in the area, arbitrators may be offended by advocates who 
inflate damage claims. If this is the case, then we would expect to see 
a process in which arbitrators are much less likely to award most of 
                                                          
6 Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will 
Employment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62, 115 (2008). 
7 Christopher R. Drahozal, Mandatory Arbitration: A Behavioral Analysis of Private 
Judging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105–32 (2004); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or 
Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 
WASH. U.L.Q. 637 (1996). 
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the amount claimed if there was a large initial claim. If accurate, this 
phenomenon could provide an important incentive for employers 
concerned about large damage awards from juries to adopt employer-
promulgated arbitration procedures. Conversely, the assumption that 
employment arbitrators are less likely to make large damage awards 
may underlie some of the opposition to employment arbitration from 
plaintiff advocates.  
So far, we have a series of competing explanations for what goes 
on in arbitrator decision-making, which suggest different patterns that 
we should see in the distribution of case outcomes. Next, we turn to 
our empirical analysis to consider which of these stories are more 
consistent with what we observe in our data.  
The Data 
For this study, we analyzed all employment arbitration cases 
administered by the AAA in the year 2008. The AAA is the largest 
arbitration service provider in the employment arbitration field. Many 
employers explicitly designate the AAA as the service provider in 
their standard arbitration agreements with employees and incorporate 
the AAA’s employment arbitration rules into their procedures by 
reference. Use of AAA employment arbitration case files has the 
advantage of providing a reasonably large data source for analysis. 
Given its size and prominence in the employment arbitration field, the 
AAA’s cases can be taken as representative of a significant segment 
of employment arbitration activity.  
At the same time, there may be some limitations on generalizing 
this data to the whole universe of employment arbitration. The AAA 
has played a prominent role in debates about employment arbitration 
and was represented in the task force that developed the Due Process 
Protocol to establish basic fairness standards for employment 
arbitration.8 The AAA’s own rules for administration of employment 
arbitration cases reflect features of the Due Process Protocol. As an 
organization, the AAA has indicated that it will not administer 
arbitration cases under procedures that violate its own rules. 
However, employers are also free to craft procedures that designate 
their own arbitrators and rules and may not make use of any third-
party arbitration service provider––what are commonly known as ad 
                                                          
8 Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out 
of the Employment Relationship, 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 142 at 534:401 (May 9, 
1995).   
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hoc arbitrations. It is unknown to what degree these ad hoc 
arbitrations do or do not operate under procedures incorporating due 
process protections similar to those provided by the AAA rules. As a 
result, it is certainly possible that our analysis is examining a segment 
of the employment arbitration field operating under relatively higher 
fairness protections. 
We obtained basic data on all 440 employment arbitration cases 
administered by the AAA that were awarded and closed during the 
2008 calendar year. This included information on claim and award 
amounts. We also coded additional information from a subset of 286 
arbitration case files. This allowed us to gather more detailed data on 
these cases, such as the type of legal claim being made and 
characteristics of the employee involved. Our dataset includes both 
cases deriving from employer-promulgated procedures and cases 
deriving from individually negotiated agreements. Under employer-
promulgated procedures, the employer presents the arbitration 
agreement to the employee, usually at the time of hiring, as a term and 
condition of employment. In this context, standard procedures are 
designed to cover employees as a group, similar to general work rules 
or benefit plans. This type of arbitration agreement is a classic adhesion 
contract. By contrast, under individually negotiated agreements, 
arbitration is included as a provision in an individual employment 
contract whose terms are subject to bargaining between the parties. The 
AAA determines whether each case involves an employer-promulgated 
procedure or an individually negotiated agreement. Where the case is 
determined to involve an employer-promulgated procedure, the AAA 
requires that it be administered under the AAA’s standard 
employment arbitration rules that are not modifiable by the parties. 
Arbitral Decision-Making Results 
We begin by examining the issue of whether arbitrators are splitting 
the baby in employment arbitration.  There are a number of potential 
indicators of such a tendency that we can test. First, we can look at 
whether plaintiff win rates suggest an attempt to approximate a 50/50 
split between the parties over time. So, for example, an arbitrator 
hoping for future selection by both sides might tend to balance out 
over time how many cases are won by each side. However, if we 
examine the plaintiff win rates reported in Table 1, we see little 
evidence of this type of a split-the-baby approach by employment 
arbitrators. In cases under employer-promulgated procedures where 
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the employee was the plaintiff, employees won 24.7 percent of the 
time and employers won 75.3 percent of the time, which does not 
suggest an attempt to split the outcomes between the parties. Cases 
involving employer-promulgated procedures where the employer was 
the plaintiff were closer to an even split with employers winning 57.1 
percent of the time and employees 42.9 percent of the time. When we 
look at cases deriving from individually negotiated agreements, we 
again see a lack of evidence of 50/50 splitting, with plaintiffs winning 
almost two thirds of the cases, whether brought by employees (64.6  
percent win rate) or employers (66.7 percent win rate). 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Full Sample and by Plaintiff and 
Agreement Type 
 
Full 
Sample 
Employer-
Promulgated: 
Employee 
Plaintiff 
Individually 
Negotiated: 
Employee 
Plaintiff 
Employer-
Promulgated: 
Employer 
Plaintiff 
Individually
-Negotiated: 
Employer 
Plaintiff 
# of Cases 440 294 99 28 19 
Claim 
Amount 
(Mean) 
$1,201,640 $833,884 $1,775,970 $198,800 $3,037,819 
Claim 
Amount 
(Median) 
$190,000 $167,880 $233,427 $10,521 $833,433 
Plaintiff 
Win (%) 
37.5% 24.7% 64.6% 57.1% 66.7% 
Award 
Amount 
(Mean, wins 
only) 
$137,869 $81,835 $220,376 $39,002 $152,947 
Award 
Amount 
(Median, 
wins only) 
$47,384 $36,609 $75,000 $10,000 $36,014 
Award 
Amount 
(Mean, all 
cases) 
$51,344 $19,967 $142,465 $21,668 $101,964 
Partial 
Award (20–
80% of 
claim) 
15.6% 7.9% 26.0% 16.7% 40% 
  
Second, we can investigate whether the amounts awarded in cases 
tend to reflect compromise awards. To analyze this question, we 
looked at the relationship between claim amounts and award amounts 
in the cases in our dataset. We calculated the percentage of the initial 
claim that the plaintiff received in the award. For simplicity of 
presentation, we grouped the percentages of claims received into six 
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categories: 0%; >0–20%; >20–40%; >40–60%; >60–80%; and > 
80%. We then tabulated the numbers of cases in each of these 
categories and graphed the results (see Figure 1). If the arbitrators 
were splitting the baby, we would expect to see a more normal shaped 
distribution with most of the cases clustering in the middle categories. 
We find instead a U-shaped distribution in the data, with most of the 
cases clustering at either end of the distribution. For cases brought 
under employer-promulgated procedures, the largest category is 0% 
of claim awarded, but the second-largest category is award of over 80 
percent of the amount claimed. The most sparsely populated 
categories are those where the plaintiffs recovered between 20 percent 
and 80 percent of the amount claimed. Only 17 of 196 cases (or 8.7 
percent) fell into these categories. The distribution of percentages 
recovered in cases deriving from individually negotiated agreements 
also form a U-shaped distribution (see Figure 1), with the lowest and 
highest percentage recovery categories containing the largest number 
of cases. The categories between 20 percent and 80 percent recovered 
are also the most sparsely populated in this distribution.  
 
Figure 1. Percentage of Claims Awarded in  
Employment Arbitration Cases 
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What these results indicate is that there is a lack of any evidence 
that employment arbitrators favor compromise awards. The results 
comport with what would be expected in traditional litigation.  
Judicial decision-making generally involves two distinct phases, 
determination of liability and determination of damages. Initially the 
court determines whether there is any legal liability by applying the 
appropriate legal standard. If there is determined to be liability, then a 
separate determination is made of what damages were suffered and an 
appropriate award is made. In neither of these stages is there a process 
of balancing the positions of the two parties as is alleged to occur 
with split-the-baby arbitral decision-making. This produces a 
distribution like that in our data where the most common outcome is 
full denial of liability and no damages awarded. Thus the picture we 
have seen in the data of employment arbitration decision-making 
much more closely resembles this judicial model than the proposition 
that arbitrators look to compromise between the positions of the two 
sides.  
An alternative story about arbitral decision-making is that 
employment arbitrators will disfavor very large damage claims. We 
tested this argument by examining separately the distribution of 
percentages recovered for cases with large claims. Figure 2 presents 
the same categories of percentages recovered limited to those cases 
where the plaintiff claimed more than $500,000 in damages. Unlike 
the U-shaped distribution of overall recoveries, for cases with large 
damage claims we find a skewed distribution tapering off at the 
higher categories. The largest category is still zero recovery, but for 
both the employer-promulgated procedure and the individually 
negotiated agreement distributions, the second largest category of 
awards is where the plaintiff recovered more than 0 but less than 20 
percent of the amount claimed. Whereas employment arbitrators do 
not appear to split the baby, this evidence suggests that they are less 
likely to grant the full amount on larger damage claims.  
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Figure 2. Percentage of Claims Awarded in Employment Arbitration 
Cases where the Plaintiff’s Claim was More Than $500,000 
 
An alternative story about arbitrator decision-making was that 
employment arbitrators will tend to make some small award in favor 
of many claimants rather than fully denying liability. Put 
alternatively, the idea here was that if you go to arbitration, the 
arbitrator will give you something rather than entirely rejecting your 
claim. Our results do not support this proposition. There are relatively 
few small award cases. For example, the 25th percentile of the 
distribution of awards in cases brought by employees under 
employer-promulgated procedures was $12,770, meaning that only 
one-quarter of awards were smaller than that amount.  
Conclusion 
Our results indicate that contrary to persistent stereotypes, there is a 
lack of empirical evidence that employment arbitrators engage in 
split-the-baby type decision-making. Employment arbitrators do not 
tend issue compromise awards and do not appear to be engaging in a 
process of balancing outcomes across the parties in hopes of receiving 
approval from both sides for selection in future cases. Our finding of 
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a U-shaped pattern in the distribution of outcomes where the most 
common results are complete denial of claims, with the next most 
common being awarding of most of the damages claimed, is striking 
and inconsistent with baby-splitting assumptions.  
When we look at decision-making processes in employment 
arbitration, we see more resemblance to a legal process of 
determining liability and damages than to a process of balancing the 
positions of the parties through compromise decisions and evening 
out of the success rates of each side. To the degree that there is a 
particular effect in employment arbitration decision-making, we find 
it is one of denying or reducing large claim amounts rather than one 
of splitting the baby between the two sides. In addition, we find little 
evidence that arbitrators tend to issue small token awards in cases 
rather than simply denying liability.  
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